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Key points 
This Policy Brief argues that the mid-term review of Europe 2020 should be approached on three 
different levels in order to be effective: i) the revision and update of the content of the Europe 2020 
strategy, including its objectives, targets and major flagship initiatives; ii) the reform of the governance 
of the strategy; and iii) the repositioning of the strategy at the core of EU policy. The future of Europe 
2020 lies in its ability to become the protagonist of a new season in EU policy, in which countries can 
apply for more flexibility only if they can prove both structural reform and good governance. By 
establishing a ‘new deal’ among member states, an improved Europe 2020 strategy can help Europe to 
complete its transition from austerity to prosperity. 
Recommendations 
How can these objectives be realised? The content of the strategy should be revised to include 
initiatives on infrastructure, the internal market and administrative capacity at all levels of government. 
Once the flagship initiatives and the indicators have been thoroughly reviewed, it would be important 
to ensure that: 
 The European Commission drafts its Annual Growth Survey with specific reference to progress 
achieved and further progress needed on the way towards the Europe 2020 objectives and goals. 
 Member states should break down the objectives at the sub-national level and coordinate regional 
reform plans (where appropriate). 
 Member states should plan their spending of EU cohesion funds as a function of their national/sub-
national reform plans. 
 National reform plans and proposed spending plans at the national and sub-national levels should 
be accompanied by an in-depth impact evaluation. 
 All reforms, besides the ex ante impact evaluations, should be accompanied by a plan to implement 
the identified reforms, a monitoring plan based on clear indicators, and a time horizon for the mid-
term and the ex post evaluation of the proposed reforms. 
 The European Commission should validate the plan by applying clear conditionalities. 
.
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Introduction 
This Policy Brief looks at available options for 
the mid-term review of Europe 2020, which is 
currently being addressed both by the European 
Commission and by several Council formations 
under the aegis of the Italian presidency of the 
EU, and will be finalised by March 2015.  
The paper argues that the mid-term review of 
Europe 2020 should be approached at three 
different levels: i) the revision and update of the 
content of the Europe 2020 strategy, including 
its objectives, targets and major flagship 
initiatives; ii) the reform of the governance of 
the strategy; and iii) the repositioning of the 
strategy at the core of EU policy. Restoring the 
centrality of Europe 2020 will require better, up-
to-date indicators; a set of consistent and 
comprehensive flagship initiatives; a bottom-up 
approach to target-setting; a stronger set of 
incentives and conditionalities; more 
consistency with cohesion policy; and more 
coherence with EU legislation and national 
reform programmes. Moreover, the paper 
argues that Europe 2020 could (and should) 
become more central, also in the debate on the 
need for more flexibility in national fiscal 
policies in the name of stronger growth. The 
future of Europe 2020 rests on its ability to 
become the protagonist in a new season in EU 
policy, in which countries can apply for more 
flexibility only if they can prove both structural 
reform and good governance. By establishing a 
‘new deal’ among member states, an improved 
Europe 2020 strategy could help Europe to 
complete its transition from austerity to 
prosperity. 
 
here is no doubt that 2014 has been a 
peculiar year for the European Union, 
with a new Parliament starting its 
activities after the controversies of the May 
elections, and a new European Commission 
officially approved by the European Parliament 
on October 20th. Now that Jean-Claude Juncker 
has officially become the new President of the 
European Commission, the debate on the future 
of the EU is even more animated than before, 
and calls for the definition of a new vision 
oriented towards growth, rather than austerity, 
have been formally endorsed by Juncker 
himself. Needless to say, significant 
contributions to this debate have come from the 
recent actions and statements of ECB President 
Mario Draghi, who repeatedly called for 
national governments to stimulate demand 
through investment and more expansionist 
policy directly aimed at growth.1 The end of the 
‘austerity obsession’ of the EU was also evoked 
by French Prime Minister François Hollande 
and his Finance Minister Sapin, who recently 
announced that France would not respect the 
rules of the Fiscal Compact for next year, and in 
the name of growth-oriented reforms would 
adopt more expansionist policies, leading the 
deficit/GDP ratio to reach 4.4% next year.2 
In this debate, many commentators have argued 
that there are very few concrete ideas being 
proposed by advocates of a growth-oriented 
season for the EU. Juncker himself has spoken of 
a €300bn plan to stimulate investment, but the 
details of that plan are still obscure.3 And while 
the quest for consistent and valuable ideas 
continues, many commentators tend to forget 
that the EU already has a strategy for growth, 
but that strategy has largely been swept under 
the carpet in the past four years. The strategy is 
called ‘Europe 2020’, and it was launched back 
in 2010 while the financial crisis was still raging, 
when no one had a clue that the crisis would 
become a sovereign debt crisis that mostly hit 
the eEurozone. As a follow-up to the better 
known, but largely ineffective Lisbon strategy 
that was supposed to make Europe “the most 
                                                     
1 See Mario Draghi, “Unemployment in the euro area, 
Annual central bank symposium in Jackson Hole”, 22 
August 2014 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/ 
date/2014/html/sp140822.en.html). 
2  See “France warns of budget overshoot”, Financial 
Times (by Hugh Carnegy, 10 September 2014, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/368909a8-38b6-11e4-
9526-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3G8Hikg5G).  
3 See Juncker’s presentation at the European Parliament, 
15 July 2014 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/us/en/ 
news_events/news/news_2014/news_jul_2014/juncke
r_programme.html). 
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dynamic and competitive knowledge-based 
economy” in the world in the 2000-2010 decade, 
Europe 2020 seeks to achieve smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth for the current decade, 
and thus features targets and objectives to be 
achieved mostly by 2020. 4  Such targets have 
been agreed upon by national governments of 
the EU member states, and as such constitute, in 
principle, much more than a reference 
framework for national reforms. They should, in 
fact, be setting the agenda and the key priorities 
for every government of the Union. 
Against this background, the first four years of 
Europe 2020’s implementation tell a different 
story. As mentioned above, the ambitious 
growth strategy of the EU has been largely 
obscured by the need to tackle the economic 
crisis by strengthening the governance of the EU 
semester, even more than that of the eurozone. 
The ‘Six pack’, the ‘Fiscal treaty’ and the ‘Two 
pack’ have reshaped the relationship between 
national governments and the European 
Commission, which now has more levers to 
trigger reforms by member states, in particular 
through the ‘Country-specific 
recommendations’ issued every year and 
addressed to member states. 5  This new 
governance has, so far, mostly concentrated on 
austerity, but increasingly looks at the need for 
growth-oriented reforms, most often with no 
reference whatsoever to Europe 2020. This 
creates uncertainty for national governments, 
due to the absence of a clear vision and a 
consistent framework for coordinated reforms in 
the EU28.  
As foreseen in 2010, in March 2015 Europe 2020 
will have to be subject to a ‘mid-term review’. 
As a consequence, the reflection on how to 
review the strategy will have to take place 
mostly during the second half of 2014, a period 
that coincides with the Italian presidency of the 
Council and with the first steps of a new 
                                                     
4 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm  
5  See the 2014 Country-specific recommendations 
(http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-
happen/country-specific-
recommendations/index_en.htm).  
Commission and the newly elected European 
Parliament. As a matter of fact, the Italian 
presidency has included the review in its 
agenda, and decided to address possible options 
for the mid-term review in the meetings of each 
of the relevant Council formations: this will lead 
to the definition of an official proposal for the 
mid-term review, to be presented in December 
at the General Affairs Council. The programme 
of the Italian presidency states that the 
presidency “will make every possible effort to 
revitalise the Europe 2020 strategy and facilitate 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”, and 
that it “intends to promote an open debate to 
increase the effectiveness and relevance of the 
Europe 2020 strategy”. 6  This almost 
unprecedented level of attention to Europe 2020 
can bring significant value to the debate on 
Europe’s growth in years to come, and as such 
constitutes a ‘one-time opportunity’ for the re-
definition of the scope and success of EU action 
in the years to come.  
This Policy Brief looks at available options for 
the mid-term review of Europe 2020, and 
addresses the question of how to make the most 
of Europe’s growth strategy in the coming 
months. The paper is structured as follows. 
Section 1, below, contains a brief description of 
the Europe 2020 strategy, as well as the results 
achieved so far, as described in a recent 
stocktaking communication of the European 
Commission, released in March 2014.7 Section 2 
discusses possible changes to the substance of 
Europe 2020, including the seven ‘flagship 
initiatives’ launched in 2010, as well as the 
objectives and indicators envisaged by the 
strategy. Section 3 addresses the governance of 
the strategy, and in particular its basic 
architecture, and existing arrangements to 
ensure that EU institutions and member states 
                                                     
6 See the Official Programme of the Italian Presidency 
(http://italia2014.eu/media/1349/programma_en1_de
f.pdf). 
7 See European Commission Communication, “Taking 
stock of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth”, COM(2014) 130, 14 March 2014 
(http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/europe2020stoc
ktaking_en.pdf). 
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(not to mention regional governments) adopt it 
as a ‘pole star’ when deciding on their annual 
reform plans. Section 4 discusses options for the 
repositioning of the strategy at the core of the 
EU project. 
1. Europe 2020 after four years: A 
mid-term assessment 
Europe 2020 aimed to achieve smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth by setting five main 
objectives for the EU:  
 Increasing the employment rate of the 
population aged 20-64 to at least 75%;  
 Reaching a level of investment in research 
and development of 3% of GDP;  
 Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% 
compared to 1990 values, increasing the 
share of renewables on total energy 
consumption to 20%, and increasing energy 
efficiency by 20%;  
 Reducing poverty by lifting at least 20 
million citizens out of the risk of poverty 
and social exclusion; and  
 Reducing the rate of early school leaving by 
bringing it below 10%, and ensuring that at 
least 40% of citizens aged between 30 and 34 
have completed their tertiary education (or 
equivalent).  
These targets were accompanied by seven 
flagship initiatives.8 For each of these initiatives, 
the communication that officially launched the 
Europe 2020 strategy in 2010 allocated 
responsibility to both the EU and member 
states’ governments.9 During the early years of 
the seven flagship initiatives, more targets were 
set, which add to the main ones described 
above. For example, the Digital Agenda set 
                                                     
8  “Innovation Union”, “Digital Agenda”, “Industrial 
Policy for the Globalization Era”, “Youth on the Move”, 
“Resource-Efficient Europe”, “An Agenda for New 
Skills and New Jobs”, and the “European Platform 
against Poverty and Social Exclusion”. 
9  Communication from the Commission of 3 March 
2010, “Europe 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth”, COM(2010)2020 final.  
precise targets related to broadband speed for 
2013 and 2020; 10  and the industrial policy 
initiative led to the setting of a target to reach at 
least a 20% share of GDP attributed to 
manufacturing.11 
Finally, in terms of governance the strategy tried 
to remedy the rather weak architecture 
exhibited by its ancestor (the Lisbon strategy), 
and imposed on member states the obligation to 
present two reports every year, the Stability and 
Convergence Programme and the National 
Reform Programme, which are presented in the 
month of April and are today fully integrated in 
the European Semester, and as such form the 
basis of the European Commission’s country-
specific recommendations. As will be remarked, 
also in section 4 below, the stronger governance 
of the European Semester, achieved as a 
response to the crisis can prove essential for a 
better alignment of member states’ growth 
strategies, under the coordination of the 
European Commission. So far, however, most of 
the country-specific recommendations have 
focused on budgetary policy, even if recently the 
European Commission has ventured more often 
into recommending structural reforms, 
sometimes also reporting concrete results. 
The results achieved so far 
The Europe 2020 objectives and targets were 
adopted under the assumption that Europe 
could achieve a quick return to growth after the 
financial crisis that hit the EU in 2008, following 
the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United 
States. In 2010 three main scenarios for Europe’s 
economic outlook were considered: strong 
growth, sluggish recovery and a lost decade 
                                                     
10  See http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/about-
our-goals for a full list and explanation of the targets.   
11 Communication from the European Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions for a European Industrial Renaissance, 
COM(2014)014 final, 22 January 2014 (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/ 
?uri=CELEX:52014DC0014&from=EN).  
THE REVIEW OF THE EUROPE 2020 STRATEGY: FROM AUSTERITY TO PROSPERITY? | 5 
 
scenario.12 Four years down the road, the reality 
is somewhere between the second and the third 
scenarios, which makes many of the targets 
unattainable. In its stocktaking communication 
of March 2014, the European Commission was 
euphemistic in stating that “mixed results” had 
been achieved: as a matter of fact, only the 
education targets appear likely to be achieved 
(subject to what will be said below), together 
with the environmental target. The latter, 
however, are on track – more than as a result of 
ambitious reforms – but due to a substantial 
slowdown of industrial production and the 
economic crisis. This means that, should the EU 
be successful in restoring growth, these targets 
might once more become more difficult to reach. 
Among the targets that appear most unlikely to 
be achieved, the employment and poverty 
targets seem more distant today than they were 
in 2010. The research and development 
indicator, however meaningful one considers it 
to be, is not showing significant improvements 
over time. Finally, energy efficiency is not 
increasing significantly, and according to the 
Commission would require major efforts to be 
brought back in line with the ambitious 
objectives set four years ago. 
Europe 2020: Eight problems to be addressed 
A number of problems have emerged in the first 
four years of implementation of the strategy. 
These include:  
 The seven flagship initiatives have remained 
too isolated, sometimes too empty, and 
sometimes in conflict with each other. 
Several examples could be mentioned in this 
regard, including the absence of significant 
synergies between ‘new skills for new jobs’ 
and the Digital Agenda (there is an 
estimated shortage of 900,000 jobs in the ICT 
sector in Europe); the limited interaction 
between ‘new skills for new jobs’ and the 
‘industrial policy for the globalisation era’ 
(Europe, despite stunning unemployment 
rates, needs to create jobs in advanced 
                                                     
12 See the Communication COM(2010)2020 final, supra 
note 9. 
manufacturing, including so-called ‘green 
jobs’, which are currently lacking); the 
emerging conflict between the ‘industrial 
policy’ initiative and the ‘resource-efficient 
Europe’ initiative, especially after the launch 
of EU Action Plan on steel; and the lack of 
synergies between ‘innovation Union’ and 
the ‘Digital Agenda’. All this suggests that in 
most cases the flagship initiatives have 
become more a way to fragment 
competences and preserve regulatory 
powers than an integrated project to reduce 
duplicative efforts and achieve growth in the 
most cost-effective way. 
 The seven flagship initiatives have often 
been marginalised in the EU debate. Suffice 
it to say that, as also recalled by the 
European Commission, the adoption of the 
Employment Package in April 2012 and the 
Youth Employment Package in December 
2012 have been completed with little or no 
reference to the existing initiative ‘new skills 
for new jobs’, which shifted “the policy 
focus and communication efforts away from 
the flagship initiative”. As a consequence, 
the flagship initiative “did not fully succeed 
in creating a coherent framework for 
employment policies and exploiting the 
synergies between the different actions”, its 
“link with the European Semester has been 
limited”, in particular between the flagship 
initiative and the country-specific 
recommendations.13  
 The strategy does not lie at the core of EU 
policy today. The marginalisation of the 
flagship initiatives meant that no reference 
to Europe 2020 could be heard in the current 
debate over the future of EU policy (at least 
until the Italian presidency decided to adopt 
the review as a priority). At the EU level, 
only the Committee of the Regions has 
decided to adopt a consistent, coherent and 
thorough reflection on the upcoming review, 
mostly denouncing the lack of a successful 
ownership of the strategy at the local level, 
                                                     
13  See the Commission stocktaking Communication, 
supra note 7. 
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due to an ineffective focus on the territorial 
dimension (see below, section 2). 14  Most 
importantly, there is no link between the 
goals set by new EU policy initiatives and 
the existing targets set by Europe 2020. As a 
notable example, consider that European 
Commission impact assessments hardly 
refer to the need to achieve Europe 2020 
objectives as a goal of new Commission 
proposals, and rather limit themselves to 
evaluating the costs and benefits of available 
policy options.15 This fundamental element 
of policy coherence – ensuring that the daily 
activity of the European Commission in 
proposing new rules is in line with long-
term objectives – is largely missing at the EU 
level. Not to mention the lack of motivation 
and impact assessment of most amendments 
voted by the European Parliament, and the 
persistent lack of accountability and 
transparency of the Council, which adopts 
decisions that never refer to the alignment 
between the proposed rules and the 
objectives set (in agreement with all member 
states) back in 2010.  
 The strategy is almost unknown in member 
states, and is not setting the agenda of 
national governments, let alone the regional 
ones. As a further reflection of the lack of 
centrality of the strategy in Brussels and 
Strasbourg, it is inevitable that member 
states hardly ever referred to Europe 2020 
targets and objectives when defining their 
reform plans. The limited ambition of the 
strategy today (in stark contrast to the 
resounding statements of 2010) is easily 
observed: in the current debate, the fact that 
                                                     
14 See the Committee of the Regions’ Athens Declaration 
of March 2014 (http://cor.europa.eu/en/news/ 
Documents/2210-athens-declaration-a5.pdf).  
15  See, on this issue, Renda, A. (2011), “Law and 
Economics in the RIA world”, Intersentia. And Renda, 
A., et al. (2013), “Assessing the Costs and Benefits of 
Regulation”, Study for the European Commission 
Secretariat General, December 2013 
(http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ 
commission_guidelines/docs/131210_cba_study_sg_fin
al.pdf).   
Europe 2020 was adopted as a “reference 
framework” by some regional governments 
when deciding how to design their annual 
reform plans and how to spend EU cohesion 
funds was hailed as a success. However, 
Europe 2020 contains a set of politically 
agreed targets and actions (even legally 
binding, limited to the energy efficiency 
targets): bringing anecdotal evidence that 
shows that a limited subset of regulators 
used it as a useful reference is very far from 
sounding like a success.  
 The targets of Europe 2020 were not adapted 
to the specifics of the regional and local 
communities, resulting in a widespread lack 
of ownership. Targets were specified for 
each member state (and in most cases they 
don’t ‘add up’, meaning that if all member 
states achieved their own target, the overall 
EU target would not be achieved): however, 
given the internal fragmentation of member 
states, setting an ‘average’ target for the 
country resulted in meaningless targets for 
the regions, especially in large member 
states. A good example is the monitoring of 
innovation through the European 
Commission’s ‘Regional Innovation 
Scoreboard’, which systematically shows 
regions that are ‘leading innovators’ as 
opposed to others that are innovation 
followers, or score even more modestly. 16 
This exercise, certainly useful as a 
descriptive tool, cannot be considered useful 
in prescriptive terms: as a matter of fact, not 
all regions can attain the same level of 
innovation, just as in the US no one expects 
Montana or Wyoming to be as innovative as 
California or Massachusetts. The setting of 
targets that are more tailored to the 
achievable potential of a given region would 
be the very first precondition for the 
adoption to these targets, and Europe 2020 
as a whole, as a ‘pole star’ for regional and 
national reform plans. And at the same time, 
                                                     
16  See e.g., the European Union Regional Innovation 
Scoreboard 2014 (http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ 
policies/innovation/policy/regional-
innovation/index_en.htm). 
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it would be a basic precondition for 
increasing the sense of ‘ownership’ of the 
initiative by EU citizens and their local 
regulators.  
 The strategy was not fully linked to EU 
cohesion funds. At least in the early years of 
implementation, little was done to ensure 
that member states earmarked funds to be 
spent on the basis of initiatives that would 
appear in line with Europe 2020 objectives. 
This is also because funds are spent at the 
regional level, and in most cases targets 
were only broken down at the national level 
(see bullet point above). Only in the past two 
years, and even more within the new 2014-
2020 multi-annual financial framework, does 
the link between structural funds and 
Europe 2020 targets seem to have been 
reinforced. However, a lot remains to be 
done to ensure consistency between these 
two fundamental lines of EU action.  
 Some of the indicators appear to be very 
imperfect proxies of the problems they are 
supposed to address. This is the case, in 
particular, for the objective of reaching 3% of 
expenditure in R&D over GDP, which is a 
perfect example of an input, rather than an 
outcome, indicator, and by itself falls quite 
short of guaranteeing the achievement of a 
more innovative Union. Similarly, the need 
to rely on an absolute poverty indicator, 
rather than a relative one, as currently 
happens, has been raised by several experts 
and academics in recent years.  
 The seven flagship initiatives were 
insufficient to restore growth from the very 
beginning. This is a rather uncontroversial 
statement today. Suffice it to recall that, 
according to the European Commission, for 
most of the seven initiatives the foreseen 
activities have been either completed, or all 
launched. For example, most initiatives 
planned under the ‘European platform 
against poverty’ have been reportedly 
launched and implemented (the 
Commission has delivered approximately 
two-thirds of the 64 actions), but poverty in 
Europe is on the rise, and there is no strategy 
left.17 This suggests that the level of ambition 
of at least some of the flagship initiatives 
was insufficient to achieve the smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth evoked by 
the strategy as a whole. Even more 
importantly, there are significant ‘elephants 
in the room’, i.e. issues that are central to 
Europe’s recovery, which are totally or 
partially unaddressed by the flagship 
initiatives. These certainly include the Single 
Market, a coherent policy on infrastructure, 
and good governance at all levels of 
government.  
2. Where do we go from here? 
Reviewing the content of the 
Europe 2020 strategy 
For what concerns the review of the content of 
the strategy, there are various alternative 
options that could be pursued, which reflect 
different levels of ambition. To be sure, doing 
nothing would not be a viable option, for the 
reasons outlined above: most of the targets are 
either unattainable or obsolete, and some of 
them are also very imperfect proxy for the 
outcomes they are meant to represent. 
Accordingly, the minimum change required 
would be to update the targets set in 2010 to 
reflect the current situation, and thus set a new 
frontier for what can be possibly achieved by 
the EU28 in 2020. 
Below, proposals are presented in ascending 
order of ambition, distinguishing between 
revisions of the Europe 2020 targets, revisions of 
the flagship initiatives, and a possible revision 
of the ultimate goals of the strategy. 
Reviewing the targets, and adding more  
Some of the Europe 2020 targets deserve a 
careful rethink, whereas others could be 
maintained as they are. Among the former 
group:  
                                                     
17  See the Commission stocktaking communication, 
supra note 7. 
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 The target of spending 3% of GDP in 
research and development must either be 
replaced, or at least complemented by 
output indicators representing the level of 
innovation taking place in a given portion of 
territory. In this respect, the indicators used 
in the innovation scoreboard of the 
European Commission appear more 
meaningful and useful, provided that 
related targets are defined in a way that 
reflects the potential of each region of the 
EU28 (the European Commission could set 
national targets with member states, but the 
latter should specify regional targets). 
Recently, the European Council called on the 
Commission to develop a complementary 
indicator focused on innovation ‘outputs’.18 
 The target on poverty is incomplete, and 
should be complemented by an ‘absolute’ 
target that looks more accurately at the 
percentage of the population that is lifted 
out of the poverty and material deprivation 
area in each member state. 19  The UK, for 
example, did not set any target under the 
poverty and social exclusion pillar of the 
Europe 2020 strategy, except for “existing 
targets set down in the 2010 Child Poverty 
Act which are profiled as percentages”. The 
Commission itself reported that “it was not 
possible for Member States to agree on a 
single indicator to express the target on the 
reduction of the number of people at risk of 
poverty, hence an indicator made up of three 
components is commonly used”. No real 
region-specific targets have been set in this 
area, and the allocation of targets to the 
different regions seems to have encountered 
significant problems.20  
                                                     
18  See the European Commission’s Communication, 
“Measuring innovation output in Europe: towards a 
new indicator”, COM(2013)624, 13 September 2013. 
19  See i.a. the World Bank (2015), “A Measured 
Approach to Ending Poverty and Boosting Shared 
Prosperity: Concepts, Data, and the Twin Goals”, Policy 
Research Report, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 
doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0361-1.  
20 Suffice it to quote a recent survey of the Committee of 
the Regions, which reported the following statement by 
More generally, the European Commission’s 
stocktaking exercise in March 2014 
acknowledges that “the targets on employment 
and education do not say much about the 
quality of the work occupied or the levels or 
adequacy of skills achieved”, and that “some 
targets – such as the ones on education – are 
more directly within the realm of public 
authorities, while others – such as employment 
or spending on R&D – reflect broader economic 
trends”.21 
A different issue is whether other targets should 
be added. This chiefly depends on whether the 
overall objectives of Europe 2020 and the 
flagship initiatives will remain unchanged. If 
new flagship initiatives are introduced (see 
section 2.2 below), this would lead to the 
addition of new targets. At the same time, 
should the overall goal of Europe 2020 shift 
from growth to well-being (see section 2.3 
below), indicators of well-being would have to 
be introduced and monitored on a yearly basis 
for each member state.  
In the absence of such major changes, the only 
indicator that seems likely to be introduced in 
the review is an indicator of resource 
efficiency, also because Eurostat has now 
published a resource efficiency scoreboard with 
resource productivity as lead indicator. In the 
EU Environment Action Programme to 2020 (7th 
EAP), member states and the European 
Parliament decided to establish indicators and 
set targets for resource efficiency and to assess 
whether it would be appropriate to include a 
lead indicator and target in the European 
                                                                                       
a Spanish respondent: “Spain has set a national goal of 
reducing the population at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion to 1.4-1.5 million people by the year 2020. The 
translation of this goal for Catalonia results in the 
reduction of the population at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion in 240,000 people, but this proportionality 
does not respond in any way to regional particularities. 
Given that the rate of people at risk of poverty in 
Catalonia stands currently at 27% of the population … 
the reduction target by 2020 is far removed from being 
significant and useful to the situation.” 
21  See the Commission stocktaking communication, 
supra note 7. 
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Semester. Resource productivity, as measured 
by GDP divided by Raw Material Consumption, 
has been identified as an appropriate candidate 
for such a target.22  
Should the flagship initiatives be reviewed? 
A thorough review of Europe 2020 could also 
consider a revision of the flagship initiative, 
especially since some of them have proven to be 
incomplete, others are close to completion, and 
overall the initiatives do not seem to include 
some of the core drivers of economic growth 
and well-being in the EU. Certainly, a lot must 
be done to upgrade the flagship initiative on 
employment (new jobs) and education (new 
skills), to enable a more effective and 
comprehensive set of initiatives aimed at 
improving the match between supply and 
demand of labour in the Union.  
Furthermore, a shift is needed, from targets set 
at the EU level and translated into actions to be 
adopted at national level, towards joint actions 
aimed at achieving more economic integration 
at the EU level, and thus pan-European targets 
that are more than the sum of national targets.   
In more detail: 
 An initiative on infrastructure. Rather than 
a Digital Agenda looking at broadband 
infrastructures and eSkills (the latter clearly 
overlapping with the “new skills for new 
jobs” flagship initiative), it would make 
sense to launch an initiative on the pan-
European converged infrastructure, which 
encompasses e-communications, media, 
smart energy markets and grids, and most 
notably transport  – so far left out of the 
                                                     
22 In the Communication “Towards a circular economy: 
A zero waste programme for Europe”, COM(2014)398, 
the Commission states that “The review of the Europe 
2020 strategy is currently underway supported by 
public consultation to gather all views on its 
development. The Commission therefore considers that 
any decision on setting a resource productivity headline 
target should be taken in the review, after taking into 
account the results of public consultation together with 
recommendations of the European Resource Efficiency 
Platform”. 
strategy. Infrastructure is indeed converging 
and increasingly interdependent, and this 
requires coordinated action to increase its 
resilience and efficiency throughout the 
territory of the Union. Such a flagship 
initiative would also be a perfect match for 
the EU critical infrastructure protection 
(CIP) initiatives, and also – most importantly 
– for possible financing of EU infrastructure 
through Eurobonds and actions by the 
European Investment Bank.  
 An initiative on the Single Market. As 
stated above, in section 1, the Single Market 
is the real ‘elephant in the room’ of the 
Europe 2020 strategy. This is a structural 
problem of the current strategy, which is 
based on the fragmentation of targets at the 
member state level, but not on the 
achievement of common goals such as 
economic integration. An initiative on the 
Single Market should be tightly coordinated 
with the portfolios of the new 
Commissioners in charge of the Internal 
Market, of Financial Services and of the 
Digital Agenda, and should be coordinated 
by the new Vice President for the Digital 
Single Market. The focus of the initiative 
should mostly fall on services (where most 
of the internal market work is still to be 
done), and in particular on digital services. 
The starting point for such an initiative 
would be the work already started with the 
Single Market Acts (I and II). The initiative 
could count on a set of indicators such as 
those recently proposed by Pelkmans et al. 
(2014).23 
 An initiative on administrative capacity 
and regulatory reform at all levels of 
government. Such an initiative would 
ideally be coordinated by the new Vice 
President for Better Regulation, Inter-
                                                     
23 See Pelkmans, J. et al. (2014), “Towards Indicators for 
Measuring the Performance of the Single Market”, 
Study for the European Parliament 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ 
note/join/2014/518749/IPOL-
IMCO_NT(2014)518749_EN.pdf).  
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institutional relations and Fundamental 
Rights of the European Commission. 24  Its 
potential scope would include: i) the 
strengthening of better regulation in EU 
institutions, most notably the European 
Parliament and the Council; ii) the 
strengthening of better regulation tools and 
administrative capacity in national 
governments, parliaments and 
administrative agencies; iii) the 
strengthening of the capacity of regional and 
local administrations, especially when 
implementing and enforcing EU legislation; 
and iv) tackling corruption at all levels of 
government, and in particular at the local 
level. Indicators on these four aspects would 
ideally refer to consolidated experiences 
such as the OECD ‘government at a glance’ 
indicators, and governance indicators such 
as those used by the World Bank.  
Adding these three initiatives would represent a 
significant step forward for the remainder of the 
decade. As a matter of fact, the current debate 
on the need for more flexibility in the 
coordination of economic policy in the EU, 
coupled with more respect for national 
specificities, raises the problem of how to 
respect the EU’s diversity, at the same time 
increasing the level of trust between member 
states. Stronger administrations, greater capacity 
to deliver on reforms and lower corruption are 
starting points to achieve this result without 
requiring top-down standardisation of economic 
recipes. At the same time, emphasising the pan-
European nature of Europe 2020 targets also 
helps to convey the message that member states 
are not competing to achieve the targets, but 
rather cooperating towards a brighter future.   
A strategy for growth, or well-being? 
Another possible approach to the reform of the 
Europe 2020 strategy, which seems very difficult 
to attain in the near future, however, is the shift 
                                                     
24 See Schrefler, L., J. Pelkmans & A. Renda (2014), What 
can the Better Regulation Commissioner do for the EU?, 
CEPS (http://www.ceps.eu/book/what-can-better-
regulation-commissioner-do-eu).  
from a growth- (or GDP-)oriented strategy 
towards a set of actions that target the well-
being of EU citizens. The ultimate consequence 
of this shift would be the possibility to attach 
greater weight to those policy domains that are 
empirically found to represent the most 
significant drivers of individual well-being, i.e. 
safety and security (including most notably 
economic security due to employment), 
education, health, access to culture and more 
broadly social interactions.25 The debate on the 
need for a different narrative for the EU and a 
new set of actions that go beyond GDP is 
present, but not entirely developed within EU 
institutions, despite current efforts in the 
‘Beyond GDP’ project.26 
Designing future flagship initiatives, especially 
for Europe 2020 social dimension issues, in a 
way that captures the essence of the current 
debate on well-being, would represent a 
quantum leap for the future of the strategy. It 
could also prelude to a future (beyond 2020) in 
which the EU is much closer to its citizens as it 
not only deals with economic stability and 
austerity, but also with the factors that 
contribute to individual well-being, happiness 
or life satisfaction.27  
3. Governance as the Achilles heel of 
the Europe 2020 strategy  
Governance has always been a big problem for 
EU growth strategies: the ‘Lisbon Agenda’ that 
preceded the Europe 2020 strategy had largely 
failed before the financial crisis, as testified by 
the 2004 Kok report (the mid-term review report 
of the Lisbon strategy) and also by subsequent 
progress reports of the European Commission 
(e.g. the ones on the i2020 strategy). A large part 
in this failure can be attributed to the choice of 
                                                     
25  See Eurostat’s feasibility study 
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/broaderprogress/pdf/ 
Feasibility_study_Well-Being_Indicators.pdf).  
26 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/beyond_gdp/ 
index_en.html  
27 See the UK Life Satisfaction approach, as described in 
Renda et al. (2014), supra note 15.  
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linking the strategy to the ‘Open Method of 
Coordination’, built on the premise that “the 
Member States could be trusted to evaluate 
themselves and motivate each other to achieve 
greater goals through coordination at Member-
State level: in other words, they were left to their 
own devices”. The Kok report already 
denounced in 2004 that the strategy’s 
disappointing delivery was “due to an 
overloaded agenda, poor coordination and 
conflicting priorities” and that “a key issue has 
been the lack of determined political action”.28  
The Europe 2020 strategy tried to fix some of 
these problems by allocating more 
responsibilities to member states for the 
achievement of the targets, and by setting more 
country-specific targets. At the same time, the 
link established with the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) is still too weak, and has ended up 
mostly being replaced by an almost total 
emphasis on austerity measures, rather than 
growth-oriented ones. Also, the link between 
the Europe 2020 goals and the use of EU 
structural funds has been too weak: even if this 
link appears stronger now under the 2014-2020 
MFF, it must also be recalled that the budget 
endowment for the MFF has been subject to cuts 
dictated by governments that feared money-
wasting behaviour by some of the member 
states, resulting in no additional growth.  
Put simply, the governance of Europe 2020 is 
broken since member states have de facto and de 
jure no incentive to align their agendas to the 
target set by the strategy. This is confirmed by 
the absence of any reference to the agenda in the 
overwhelming majority of government plans at 
national and regional level in the EU28. Against 
this background, it is clear that only procedural 
reform and a new set of conditionalities can fix 
the strategy’s governance and potentially 
                                                     
28 See the Kok Report, Facing the Challenge, 1 November 
2004 (http://ec.europa.eu/research/evaluations/ 
pdf/archive/fp6-evidence-base/ 
evaluation_studies_and_reports/evaluation_studies_an
d_reports_2004/the_lisbon_strategy_for_growth_and_e
mployment__report_from_the_high_level_group.pdf).  
restore its effectiveness. Possible areas of 
intervention in this respect are outlined below.  
Stronger consistency and policy coherence 
at the EU level 
The European Commission’s impact assessment 
documents should motivate the choice of 
preferred policy options, with explicit reference 
to the Europe 2020 objective that these options 
can contribute to, where appropriate. This 
implies that the upcoming revised impact 
assessment guidelines incorporate a specific set 
of questions to help Commission officials ensure 
coherence between their proposed actions and 
the ultimate, long-term objectives of the EU. 
Likewise, the amendments proposed by the 
European Parliament should be subject to the 
same proof, and the same should happen for the 
Council.  
Reconciling the macro- and the micro-
economic policies of the EU  
This requires, inter alia, that: i) the Commission 
devotes similar attention to structural reforms 
(micro-economic issues) and issues of financial 
stability in its Annual Growth Strategy and in 
the subsequent Country-Specific 
recommendations; ii) the Competitiveness 
Council should be strengthened and placed at 
the same level of the ECOFIN, and both should 
work under the coordination of a stronger 
General Affairs Council.  
Introduce a ‘micro-conditionality’ for the 
attributions of cohesion funds  
Currently, the macro-economic conditionality 
ensures that the effectiveness of the five 
European structural and investment funds is not 
undermined by unsound macroeconomic 
policies, in line with the European Council 
conclusions of 8 February 2013. Such 
conditionality has both a preventive and a 
corrective arm. 29  At the same time, cohesion 
                                                     
29  Under the preventive arm of the macro-economic 
conditionality the Commission may request 
amendments to a member state's partnership agreement 
in order to address macroeconomic imbalances, for 
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funds have been increasingly tied to the Europe 
2020 objectives, especially after 2014, but the 
current system does not seem to be triggering 
sufficient coherence between member states’ 
national reform plans and their decisions on 
how to spend funds from EU and national 
resources.30 
Improving the ‘ownership’ of Europe 2020 
by strengthening its territorial dimension 
As observed in section 1, one of the main 
outstanding problems of the Europe 2020 
strategy is the limited extent to which it 
permeated the agenda of national and local 
authorities, thus creating a widespread lack of 
ownership among regional and local 
administrations, which has been repeatedly 
denounced, inter alia, by the Committee of the 
Regions.31  One of the reasons for this lack of 
ownership is certainly the absence of adequate 
territorial differentiation in the definition of the 
targets to be achieved at the end of the decade. 
In recent surveys on each of the flagship 
initiatives run by the Committee of the Regions, 
this element emerged very clearly, especially 
from the opinions of local regulators.  
                                                                                       
instance. Where a member state fails to respond 
satisfactorily to such a request, the Commission may 
propose to the Council to suspend part or all of the 
payments for the programmes concerned. The proposed 
suggestion requires the support of a qualified majority 
of the Council to take effect. Under the corrective arm, 
the Commission must propose to suspend part or all 
commitments or payments when a member state fails to 
take corrective action within the economic governance 
procedures (e.g. the excessive deficit procedure and the 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure). A proposal to 
suspend commitments is deemed adopted unless it is 
rejected by the Council with qualified majority. A 
proposal to suspend payments requires the support of a 
qualified majority of the Council. 
30 The ring-fencing provisions require member states to 
concentrate 50-80% of the ERDF in 2014-20 on the RTDI, 
SME Competitiveness and Low-Carbon Economy 
Thematic Objectives, with a sliding scale that allows for 
lower concentration in Less-Developed Regions 
compared to More-Developed Regions.  
31 See the Athens Declaration, supra note 14.  
Should the European Commission try to define 
targets that are specifically tailored to the 
potential of each and every region of the EU? 
Ideally, this activity should be performed by 
national governments in cooperation with 
regional administrations, in a ‘cascading 
approach’ that allocates responsibility to 
authorities that possess the best knowledge of 
the territory. If this really occurred, possibly 
along with specific incentives for local 
administrators to seek EU funding to obtain 
specific targets, and with similar incentives in 
the internal multi-level governance, then Europe 
2020 would become a lot more than simply a 
‘reference framework’.  
In this respect, the Committee of the Regions’ 
initiative to develop a Regional Progress 
Indicator over time is a first step towards more 
effective multi-level governance in Europe 2020: 
it needs to be coupled with more consistency 
between Europe 2020 and cohesion policy, and 
with a shift from the current ‘top-down’ setting 
of indicators, towards a more bottom-up 
approach. 
4. Putting Europe 2020 back on the 
radar of EU, national and regional 
policy-makers: A proposal 
A crucial challenge that will have to be 
addressed in the upcoming mid-term review of 
the Europe 2020 strategy is the attempt to re-
position the strategy at the core of the EU 
project, and thus as the pole star of EU growth-
oriented policies in years to come. This is 
inevitably difficult, given that – as observed in 
section 1 – the strategy has lost its centrality in 
recent years. Certainly, some of the essential 
steps to restore the centrality of Europe 2020 are 
the ones already described above: better and 
updated indicators; a set of consistent and 
comprehensive flagship initiatives; a bottom-up 
approach to target setting; a stronger set of 
incentives and conditionalities; more 
consistency with cohesion policy; and more 
coherence with EU legislation and national 
reform programmes.  
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Apart from these actions, which have been 
described in sections 2 and 3, Europe 2020 could 
become an important reference in the ongoing 
debate over the need for more flexibility in 
national fiscal policies in the name of greater 
growth in coming years. As a matter of fact, 
countries that generically advocate more 
flexibility should explain and demonstrate that 
such flexibility is functional to an overall, pan-
European growth project, and that there is no 
other way to achieve growth targets than by 
exceeding the constraints of the fiscal treaty, and 
in particular the ‘3% rule’ and the medium-term 
objective assigned to each member state, to 
ensure that they converge towards a debt/GDP 
ratio of 60% in 20 years. 
Especially after the recent statements of François 
Hollande and Matteo Renzi on the need to 
review the 3% rule, it is likely that the EU will 
remain divided between austerity champions 
and flexibility champions over the coming 
months. In this context, Europe 2020 could 
provide a way to reconcile these two views, 
provided that it also contributes to achieving 
more trust between member states; something 
that necessarily has to accompany any attempt 
to relax otherwise rigid rules. This idea 
emerged, albeit tentatively, in the debate on the 
so-called ‘contractual arrangements’ or 
‘partnerships’ between the European 
Commission and member states, which had 
been evoked back in the second half of 2013 as a 
potential way to enable more ad hoc policies at 
the national level, under the cautious 
supervision of the Commission. 
How could this happen? This paper offers a 
modest proposal to strike a balance between the 
opposing views. Once the flagship initiatives 
and the indicators have been thoroughly 
reviewed, it would be important to ensure that: 
 The European Commission drafts its Annual 
Growth Survey with specific reference to 
progress achieved and further progress 
needed on the way towards the Europe 2020 
objectives and goals.  
 Member states break down the objectives at 
the sub-national level and coordinate 
regional reform plans (where appropriate) in 
a way that makes constant reference to the 
Europe 2020 goals set at regional and 
national level. 
 Member states plan their spending of EU 
cohesion funds as a function of their 
national/sub-national reform plans. 
 National reform plans and proposed 
spending plans at the national and sub-
national levels are accompanied by an in-
depth impact evaluation, which 
demonstrates that there are no better (i.e. 
more cost-effective, or more efficient) 
alternatives to the ones proposed, in order to 
reach the Europe 2020 goals. This impact 
evaluation would have to be particularly 
detailed if the reforms proposed entail a 
derogation from the constraints envisaged 
by the fiscal treaty: in this case, the national 
government would have to demonstrate that 
no available alternatives would at once be 
consistent with the fiscal treaty and achieve 
the Europe 2020 goals.  
 All reforms, besides the ex ante impact 
evaluations, should be accompanied by a 
plan to implement the identified reforms, a 
monitoring plan based on clear indicators, 
and a time horizon for the mid-term and the 
ex post evaluation of the proposed reforms.  
 The European Commission validates the 
plan by applying clear conditionalities – e.g. 
only a country on its way to reducing the 
number of infringement proceedings, with a 
good track record in cohesion funds 
spending and exhibiting good progress on 
the (new) good governance indicators would 
be able to apply for flexibility.  
In other words, the future of Europe 2020 rests 
in its ability to become the protagonist of a new 
season in EU policy, in which countries can 
apply for more flexibility only if they can prove 
both structural reform and good governance. By 
establishing this ‘new deal’ among member 
states, an improved Europe 2020 strategy can 
indeed help Europe complete its transition from 
austerity to prosperity.  
